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THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IN CRIMINAL
TAX INVESTIGATIONS
Under indictment for failure to file income tax returns,1 the de-
fendant in United States v. Dickerson2 moved to suppress as evidence
all documents and oral statements voluntarily given by him to agents
of the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) subsequent to
the initiation of a criminal tax investigation. Basing his motion on
the admitted failure of the IRS agents to advise him of his constitu-
tional rights, the defendant alleged violations of the fourth and fifth
amendments. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision' to grant defendant's motion to suppress.
4
To insure voluntary waiver of constitutional rights, said the court, the
warnings of Miranda v. Arizona r must be given to a taxpayer under
investigation at the first contact of IRS agents with the taxpayer after
a civil audit has been transferred to the Intelligence Division of the
IRS for criminal investigation.'
This Comment will demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit in
Dickerson, while avoiding the mistakes made by other circuits in
applying Miranda to criminal tax investigations, misconstrued Miranda
nonetheless. Second, the Comment will point out an alternative ap-
proach providing substantially similar protection of the taxpayer's fifth
amendment rights.
I. Escobedo AND Miranda
To analyze the Dickerson decision requiring IRS special agents to
give the Miranda warnings to taxpayers under criminal investigation,
an examination of the facts and principles of Miranda and its prede-
cessor, Escobedo v. Illinois,7 is necessary.'
In Escobedo, the petitioner was arrested on suspicion of murder
and taken to police headquarters for interrogation. Petitioner's at-
torney arrived shortly thereafter. The police refused repeated requests
by both the petitioner and his attorney for an opportunity for con-
sultation until Escobedo finally confessed to participating in the murder.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7203, defines as a misdemeanor the willful failure
to file a tax return. Upon conviction, a defendant is subject to imprisonment for not
more than 1 year, or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both. Id.
2413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
3 United States v. Dickerson, 291 F. Supp. 633 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
4 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. IV, 1969) authorizes the government to appeal from
an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress.
8384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 413 F2d at 1116-17.
7 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
8The Dickerson investigation began prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Miranda but subsequent to the Court's decision in Escobedo. 413 F2d at 1113.
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The Supreme Court found that the interrogation was a critical stage
of the prosecution-a stage at which counsel was necessary to protect
the accused's constitutional rights.' The Court held:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with
his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him
of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the
accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in
violation of the Sixth Amendment . . .1
In Miranda, the Court expanded its narrow Escobedo holding.
The Court found that police practices during custodial interrogation-
official overbearing in an intimidating, unfamiliar atmosphere--operated
to compel the suspect to abandon his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.1 Since custodial interrogation "contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and
to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," 12
the Court required that the police preface any such interrogation with
a warning that the suspect
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to [the inter-
rogation] 13
Unlike Escobedo, Miranda was based on the fifth amendment.
The purpose of the warning is to preserve the suspect's privilege against
self-incrimination.' 4 First, it permits him to exercise his privilege in-
telligently in an atmosphere free from coercive influences; " and second,
it makes clear to him "that he is faced with a phase of the adversary
9See 378 U.S. at 486. "[A] system of criminal law enforcement which comes
to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject
to abuses than a system which depends upon extrinsic evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation." Id. at 488-89 (footnotes omitted). The legal process
should not "have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he
will become aware of, and exercise, these [fifth and sixth amendment] rights." Id.
at 490 (footnote omitted).
10 Id. at 490-91 (emphasis added).
11384 U.S. at 448-50.
12 Id. at 467.
13 Id. at 479.
14 See id. at 467, 478-79.
' Id. at 468, 475.
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system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his
interest." 16
In Miranda the Court was careful to limit the scope of its holding
to "custodial interrogations," that is, to those occasions when the sus-
pect is "in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." 17 Exactly what constitutes custodial
interrogation under Miranda, however, has been the subject of much
judicial and scholarly examination."8 As one commentator has noted
in frustration: "[I]n the case of questioning away from the police
station, where there is no arrest or detention, it is all but impossible to
decide when Miranda-Escobedo rights arise." "-
A. The Criminal Tax Investigation
A prerequisite to meaningful discussion of Dickerson and its re-
lation to Miranda is a basic understanding of IRS procedures in a
criminal tax investigation. Usually, a tax fraud investigation begins
as a routine audit of a taxpayer's return by a revenue agent of the IRS
Audit Division.' The function of the revenue agent is to examine
returns for correct dollars-and-cents liability. If he suspects fraud,
and if his superiors concur, then the civil audit is suspended"' and the
investigation is transferred to a special agent of the IRS Intelligence
Division.' A trained criminal investigator, the special agent further
examines the nature of the taxpayer's liability. During such exam-
ination, the special agent is able to and, when the circumstances warrant,
required to gather evidence to support a criminal prosecution.3 His
3.6 Id. at 469.
17 Id. at 444. It is unclear exactly what the Court in Miranda meant by depriva-
tion of freedom of action. See notes 39-46 infra & accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) ; Mathis v. United States, 391
U.S. 1 (1968) ; United States v. Knight, 395 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 930 (1969) ; United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Windsor
v. United States, 389 F2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation"
Within the Meaning of Miranda, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 335,
362-82 (1968); Najarian, Miranda v. Arizona: In-Custody Interrogation: An
Examination of the New Rules Further Defining the Suspect's Rights, 71 DiCK L.
REv. 116 (1966) ; Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Scope and
Application of Miranda, 37 U. Mo. K.C. L. REv. 260, 264-87 (1969).
19 Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?": California's Anticipatory Appli-
cation of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 59, 89 (1966).
20 See Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under
Escobedo and Miranda: The "Critical Stage", 53 IowA L. Rnv. 1074, 1083 (1968).
Tax fraud investigations may also begin without the preliminary civil audit when tips
are received from informers. See id.
21 See id. 1084.
22See Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investi-
gation, 44 TAXEs 660, 661 (1966).
23 See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1084-85. For further discussion of the special
agent's functions see Statement of Procedural Rules, 26 C.F.R. § 601.107(a) (1955) ;
33 Fed. Reg. 17,234-36 (1968) ; 34 Fed. Reg. 1657, 1665 (1969) ; Duke, Prosecutions
For Attempts to Evade Income Tax: Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76
YALE L.J. 1, 34-41 (1966); Weiss, Do Taxpayers Have Constitutional Rights?, 46
TAXEs 494, 498 (1968) ; Comment, Fifth Amendment Privilege in Criminal Tax
Investigations: Miranda and the Omnibus Crime Act, 42 TEmP. L.Q. 255, 256-58
(1969).
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investigation includes one or more interviews with the taxpayer, during
which the taxpayer might provide him with documentary and oral
evidence necessary to secure conviction. 4 The next IRS step is the
formal interrogation, which offers the taxpayer an opportunity to
present evidence to persuade the IRS not to recommend prosecution,
but also permits the IRS to gather additional incriminating evidence.'
The taxpayer is not ordinarily taken into custody during either his
informal contacts with the special agent or the formal interrogation,
because neither flight nor further criminal conduct is anticipated, and
the crime itself is nonviolent. 6 If the Justice Department concurs with
IRS recommendations, an indictment is issued.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Escobedo and Miranda,
courts did not consider the opportunities presented to the IRS to elicit
incriminating evidence from the taxpayer. Though a taxpayer could
invoke his fifth amendment privilege to withhold incriminating oral and
documentary testimony during an interrogation by an IRS special
agent,27 it was well-established that the IRS special agents had no
duty to advise a taxpayer of his constitutional rights or to inform him
that he was under criminal investigation.2 Furthermore, the volun-
tariness rule applied by the courts provided that if a person accused
of a crime volunteered evidence in the absence of fraud, coercion, mis-
representation, or deceit, a conscious waiver of his constitutional rights
was not essential to the admissibility of the evidence in a criminal
trialY. Although the appearance of the special agent and the setting
of the interviews (usually the taxpayer's home or office) would not
alert the average taxpayer to the fact that he was undergoing a crim-
inal investigation, 0 the courts presumed that once a civil investigation
24 As a former special agent of the IRS has noted:
At the outset of an investigation the average taxpayer is only too anxious
to cooperate, or give the appearance of cooperating, and gives the Special
Agent all of his incriminating records and makes damaging admissions. He
usually wants to show he has nothing to hide, so he doesn't invoke his consti-
tutional rights, even if he should happen to know them. Furthermore,
he does not know the significance of a Special Agent, believing him just to
be another agent, there to determine how much he owes, and he wants to
incur his goodwill. Of course, until recently the Special Agent would not
disabuse him of these impressions and, more often than not, would encourage
them. Making a case against an unrepresented taxpayer is frequently like
"taking candy from a baby."
H. Mednick, The Taxpayer's "Right to Counsel" in a Criminal Case, Dec. 15, 1969
(unpublished memorandum in Biddle Law Library at the University of Pennsylvania).
25 See Hewitt, .rtpra n6te 22, at 692.
2 6 Andrews, smpra note 20, at 1085 n.56.
27See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967); Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1948).
2 8See, e.g., United States v. Sclafani, 265 F2I 408, 414 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959) ; Turner v. United States, 222 F2d 926, 931 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955); United States v. Burdick, 214 F2d 768, 773 (3d
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 905 (1955).
29 See Hewitt, supra note 22, at 662-64.
30 See id. 690; Ludlam, Tax Fraud Investigations: A Plea for Constitutional Pro-
cedures, 43 A.B.A.J. 1009, 1010 (1957).
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began, the taxpayer knew that it might become a criminal in-
vestigation.;"
B. Application of Miranda in Tax Cases
The Supreme Court's decisions in Escobedo and Miranda forced
the lower federal courts and the IRS to reconsider the implications of
the voluntariness rule in criminal tax investigations. Dickerson was
the first circuit court opinion holding that the Miranda warnings are
required; but like Dickerson, the prior courts of appeals cases failed to
analyze fully the applicability of Miranda to tax cases.
The Miranda Court found "custodial interrogation"--defined as
interrogation after a suspect is "taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way" -So fraught
with inherent psychological pressures that "[t] he potentiality for com-
pulsion is forcefully apparent." 33 "[O]vert physical coercion or patent
psychological ploys" " need not be found in order to exclude a con-
fession: "the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings" 35 is suffi-
cient to require warnings to insure that a "statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." 16
Because IRS investigations usually take place in the taxpayer's
own home or office,37 the station house interrogation part of the
Miranda holding is inapplicable to taxpayer interrogations." But even
if the suspect is not in formal custody, the Miranda warnings may be
required if he is "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." A court must investigate the meaning of this phrase
before it can determine that warnings are or are not required.
3 1 See, e.g., United States v. Sclafani, 265 F2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 918 (1959), in which it was stated that:
A "routine" tax investigation openly commenced as such is devoid of
stealth or deceit because the ordinary taxpayer surely knows that there is
inherent in it a warning that the government's agents will pursue evidence
of misreporting without regard to the shadowy line between avoidance and
evasion, mistake and willful omission.
Id. at 414-15.
32 384 U.S. at 444 (footnotes omitted).
33 Id. at 457. That the IRS agent is not a police officer is not important when
considering whether Miranda controls. In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968),
the warnings were required during a custodial investigation even though the investi-
gator was an IRS regular agent.
34 384 U.S. at 457. In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court,
upon finding a custodial interrogation, made no attempt to determine whether in fact
there had been any evidence that the defendant was compelled to confess. See 391
U.S. at 7-8 (White, J., dissenting).
35 384 U.S. at 458.
36Id.
37See note 26 supra & accompanying text.
38 Should the IRS interview a man in custody, however, the required warnings
must be given. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) ; cf. Orozco v. Texas,
394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). For a discussion of these cases
see text accompanying notes 48-52 infra.
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The significance the Court intended this phrase to carry is unclear.
Commentators have suggested two possible readings: that the Court
was concerned with the situation of a suspect in any form of physical
custody" outside the station house setting, or that the Court was con-
cerned with the psychological setting of any investigation. 0 Adherents
of the former reading point to the two different ways the phrase is used
in the Miranda opinion: 4
police interrogation while in custody at the [police] station
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signif-
icant way,
and
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way.43
From the difference in wording, and from the constant use of "custody"
rather than "arrest," commentators have suggested that the Court was
attempting to protect citizens not in formal custody at the station house
but nevertheless physically restrained by the police.
[T]he Court understandably (albeit gingerly and uncer-
tainly) sought to protect its flanks. If "custodial inter-
rogation" were limited to questioning in a police station or to
questioning that occurs after a formal arrest, "the police
would need only to delay formal arrest or physical transfer of
an accused to the station house in order to circumvent the
constitutional safeguards Miranda dictates." "
If this interpretation is correct, then Miranda does not apply to tax
investigations, because the taxpayer is legally free to leave an IRS
interview and is not physically deprived of his freedom of action.
But the alternative reading of the phrase may bring tax cases
within the scope of Miranda. Hewitt, in The Constitutional Rights
of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation,45 argues that the Court in
Miranda was concerned not only with custody or deprivation of
physical freedom of action, but also with the psychological impact of
questioning on the individual's freedom of choice.
With the premise that the impact upon the person's mind
is the most important element, defining "deprivation of free-
39 See Kamisar, supra note 18, at 335-38.
40 See Hewitt, supra note 22, at 682-83.
41 See Kamisar, supra note 18, at 335-36.
42 384 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added).
4
3Id. at 444.
44 Kamisar, supra note 18, at 336 (quoting Commonwealth v. Stites, 427 Pa. 486,
492, 235 A2d 387, 390 (1967)) ; see United States v. Pierce, 397 F.2d 128, 130 (4th
Cir. 1968); N. SOBEL, THE NEw CoNFEssIoN STANDARDS: Miranda v. Arizona
56-8 (1966).
45 44 TAXES 660 (1966).
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dom of action in any way" should subserve that need.
. When the Revenue Agent and the Special Agent
visit him, he is under the overwhelming apprehension that he
has to cooperate, and supply them with the books and records
which they seek. In his mind, he has no freedom to act in any
other way. . . The Court did not speak of a freedom of
locomotion, or ability to move about without restraint. It
spoke of "freedom of action," which must mean a freedom to
act or belief in a freedom to act in some other manner than
that which is compelled by the circumstances. 46
If this second reading is correct, then a court faced with the question
of Miranda warnings in a tax case must acknowledge that inherent
psychological pressures in a tax investigation might require the warn-
ings. Arguably, the physical freedom of action of the taxpayer reduces
the psychological pressures on him to insignificance.47 But this ap-
proach requires nonetheless a balancing of the general psychological
atmosphere of the interview against the extent to which physical free-
dom of action can mitigate any psychological pressure. Note that if
a court were to accept this second reading of the "freedom of action"
phrase, and allow that interrogations involving psychological pressure
may be "custodial interrogations" within Miranda, it could decide once
and for all that the psychological pressures inherent in a tax investi-
gation are or are not great enough to require Miranda warnings in
all tax cases.
Recent Supreme Court decisions tend to support the first inter-
pretation of the phrase. The Court has held that "custodial interroga-
tion" may occur outside of the police station, and in the absence of a
formal arrest, if the suspect was not free to leave the scene. In Oroco
v. Texas,48 the Court held that the warnings were required when a
suspect was questioned in his bedroom. Emphasizing an officer's testi-
mony that the defendant would not have been permitted to leave had
he so desired, the Court ignored the question whether the suspect him-
self had felt free to leave. Thus an actual finding of inherent pressure
461d. 683.
47
0n the other hand, some courts have recognized that if psychological freedom
of action determines the question of compulsion, then not the suspect's legal freedom
to leave, but his feeling of freedom, is important. See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 66 Cal.
2d 438, 44849, 426 P2d 515, 521, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1967): "[Clustody occurs
if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived." See generally
Kamisar, supra note 18, at 360-82.
Hewitt implies that the taxpayer may feel compelled to cooperate with the IRS
agent. Hewitt, supra note 22, at 683. Thus perhaps the reasonable man standard
should apply. But the "subjective" test of Arnold actually rests on the apprehension
of physical custody in the mind of the suspect. Because physical custody is not
threatened in a tax investigation, and the reasonable taxpayer -would not believe himself
to be in custody, the standard is not applicable in tax cases.
48 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
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on the suspect similar to that occurring during a police station inter-
rogation was unnecessary.4 9
Similarly, in Mathis v. United States,0 the Court found that the
interrogation of a taxpayer already in prison for an unrelated crime was
a custodial interrogation requiring the Miranda warnings51 despite the
absence of overt psychological compulsion and regardless of the defend-
ant's familiarity with his surroundings at the time of the interview. 2
In no case, however, has the Court rejected the psychological
"freedom of action" reading. Because Orozco and Mathis were in
physical custody during the questioning, the Court was not forced to
consider a psychological reading of Miranda.
But even if a court were to regard both possible interpretations
of the "freedom of action" phrase, and find that Miranda does not
control because the phrase refers to physical custody rather than to
psychological pressure, it still has a duty to return to the fifth amend-
ment and determine whether the pressures exerted in tax cases are
inherently compelling. Miranda's concern with custody arose from its
concern with compulsion. Upon finding that Miranda does not apply
because of the absence of physical control, and thus of custody, in
tax cases, a court might follow this line of reasoning: ' Purely as a
matter of logic, to say that Miranda found compulsion inherent in
custodial interrogations is not to say that an inherently compelling
atmosphere may not exist in other circumstances. It is not enough
merely to state that there is no compulsion in tax investigations simply
because there is no custody. Just as Miranda demanded prophylactic
warnings to combat the inherent pressure of custodial interrogations,
so must a court require warnings upon a finding of inherent com-
pulsion outside a custodial interrogation. A court in this situation
would follow similar ground covered by a court finding the "freedom
of action" phrase susceptible to a psychological reading; and, similarly,
might properly determine that on balance the lack of physical custody
negates any inherent compulsion in the tax interview. The difference
is that the court allowing a psychological reading of the "freedom of
action" phrase may on balance find that the Miranda decision itself
controls, while the second court, having decided that Miranda refers
only to custodial interrogations and thus does not apply, may decide
that the philosophy behind Miranda-protection against inherently
compelling situations--dictates that warnings be required.
The courts of appeals of most circuits have not followed this logic.
Rather, they have found Miranda inapplicable by relying on two factual
differences between a regular criminal investigation and a tax investi-
49 Id. at 330-31 (White, J., dissenting).
50 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
51 Id. at 4-5.
52 Id. at 7-8 (White, J., dissenting).
5 See generally Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 45
F.R.D. 323, 338 (1968) ; Hewitt, supra note 22, at 685.
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gation. In a line of cases beginning with Kohatsu v. United States,"
decided between the Escobedo and Miranda decisions, the Ninth Circuit
has decided that, because in the usual criminal investigation the govern-
ment seeks a culprit responsible for a known crime, while during a tax
investigation the government seeks to determine if a crime has been
committed, there is insufficient accusatory focus on the taxpayer to
require the protections accorded regular criminal defendants.
No other circuit has fully adopted this distinction; 15 and some
courts, including the Dickerson court, have recognized the irrelevance
of the difference."' The purpose of both investigations is to discover
evidence incriminating the suspect. In support of its criticism of the
Ninth Circuit, the Dickerson court quoted language from Mathis:
"[T] ax investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions." 5T
Other circuits have refused to require the Miranda warnings in
tax cases because they have found that the taxpayer was not in custody
during the interview.-s Unfortunately, most of these courts have con-
sidered neither the possibility that custodial interrogation may mean
deprivation of freedom in the psychological sense, nor whether tax
investigations might be inherently compelling even in the absence of
custody. These courts do no more than announce a conclusory
syllogism: (1) Miranda warnings rested on the custodial nature of the
interrogation; (2) taxpayers during the IRS investigations are not in
formal custody; (3) therefore, Miranda does not require that warnings
be given in these cases. But the error in refusing to look beyond the
question of custody was discussed above."o And because "custodial
interrogation" also includes questioning when the suspect is deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way, the courts must first
investigate the meaning of the phrase before concluding that Miranda
does not apply.
The First and Fourth Circuits, while acknowledging that
"custodial interrogation" may occur if there is a "deprivation of free-
dom of action," have nonetheless inadequately investigated the meaning
4 351 F2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966) (one week after
Miranda). The Ninth Circuit has consistently followed its Kohatsu opinion. See
Selinger v. Bigler, 377 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 904
(1967); Rickey v. United States, 360 F2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
835 (1966).
-5 Several cases, however, cite Kohatsi for the proposition that Miranda does not
apply, although they do not follow the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. See, e.g., Cohen v.
United States, 405 F2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969).
,5 Even in normal criminal procedures the police do not know as a matter of fact
that a crime has been committed; they have only a reasonable belief that a crime
has been committed. See Note, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Tax Investi-
gations, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 134, 140 (1965).
57 413 F.2d at 1115 (quoting Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968)).
65 See Agoranos v. United States, 409 F2d 833, 835 (5th Cir. 1969); Hensley
v. United States, 406 F2d 481, 484 (10th Cir. 1968); Cohen v. United States, 405
F2d 34, 40 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969); United States v.
Maius, 378 F2d 716, 718-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 905 (1967).
59 See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
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of the latter phrase.' For example, in Spinney v. United States,6 the
First Circuit stated:
Clearly . . . this defendant was not deprived of his freedom
of action at all. He was not compelled to appear at the inter-
view or answer questions. He did both voluntarily..
[W]here one is legally free, albeit at the risk of unpleasant
consequences, to reject the government's invitation to appear
and participate in an I.R.S. interview, the requirements
enumerated in Miranda do not apply.'2
But apart from the absence of formal custody, the circumstances de-
scribed by the Spinney court are dubiously relevant to the voluntariness
of the evidence produced by the interview. Like the taxpayer, Miranda
was neither legally required to answer questions asked him by the
police nor to participate in their investigation of his crime. Thus, like
the syllogism cases, Spinney actually rests on the absence of physical
custody. The court did not recognize that the "freedom of action"
phrase may have more than one meaning. And even if the court had
decided that the phrase spoke only to custody (that is, the first reading),
the court still should have decided whether, in the absence of custody,
the atmosphere of the investigation was inherently compelling. Again,
the shortcoming of these cases, and of the syllogism cases, is that they
fail, first, to inquire into the meaning of "freedom of action" but simply
assume it refers to formal in-custody situations; and second, to recog-
nize that inherent compulsion is not contingent on custody. Thus, by
finding an opportunity for inherent compulsion only where there is
custody defined strictly in terms of physical control, the courts do not
scrutinize each case under the harsh light of the fifth amendment pro-
hibition established in Miranda. Only the Second Circuit has ade-
quately recognized that Miranda, while on its facts a custody case,
applied the warnings because of the inherently compelling atmosphere
of custodial police interrogations.' In United States v. Mackiewicz,0
the Second Circuit specifically addressed itself to the coercive at-
mosphere of the tax interview and decided that there was little com-
pulsion because the taxpayer was in his own home and free to ask
the agents to leave.' While the distinction made in this case seems
6 0 See Spinney v. United States, 385 F2d 908, 910 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 921 (1968); United States v. Mancuso, 378 F2d 612, 619 (4th Cir.),
modified, 387 F2d 376 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968) ; Morgan v.
United States, 377 F2d 507, 508 (1st Cir. 1967).
61 385 F2d 908 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
wId. at 910.
0
3See United States v. Caiello, 420 F2d 471 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968) ; United
States v. Squeri, 398 F2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1968).
04401 F2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968).
65 This freedom may be illusory:
It begs the question to say that the taxpayer could terminate the interview at
anytime by walking out the door. Only individuals who have not succumbed
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identical to those drawn in cases like Spinney, the Mackiewicz court
recognized that custody per se is not determinative, and based its de-
cision "not on a technical and unrealistic view of the custody require-
ment . . . but on the totality of the circumstances present at the
interview." " In essence, the Second Circuit has taken the position
that, while compulsion may be inherent in tax investigations, it is
negated by the taxpayer's relative freedom of movement.
II. TIE Dickerson DECISION
The Dickerson court followed neither the approach of those cir-
cuits relying primarily on the absence of custody, nor that of the
Second Circuit. The opinion is confusing, but apparently the majority
found that Miranda turned neither on the custody of the defendant nor
on the inherent compulsion of the police station interrogation, but on
the suspect's inability to intelligently waive his rights in an adversary
confrontation without the benefit of a warning:
We understand the teaching of Miranda to be that one con-
fronted with governmental authority in an adversary situation
should be accorded the opportunity to make an intelligent
decision as to the assertion or relinquishment of those con-
stitutional rights designed to protect him under precisely
such circumstances.
67
The Dickerson court seems to have read Miranda as resting on alterna-
tive grounds of "focus" or "custody." 08 Thus, warnings are required
not because of inherently compelling circumstances, but because the
investigation had focused on the suspect. Reasoning supporting this
argument may derive from the "obfuscating" " footnote four of the
Miranda decision:
This [custodial interrogation as defined by the opinion 7o]
is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investiga-
tion which has focused on an accused.7'
to coercive pressure will follow that course. The individual who remains to
answer questions may believe that he must do so and thus be deprived of
his freedom of action in a significant way.
Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege in Criminal Tax Investigations: Miranda and the
Omnibus Crime Act, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 255, 265 (1969).
66 401 F2d at 222.
"7413 F.2d at 1114 (emphasis added).
68 Numerous courts have similarly held in criminal cases, e.g., Windsor v. United
States, 389 F2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541,
546, 226 A2d 765, 768 (1967) ; cf. Allen v. United States, 390 F2d 476 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (degree to which suspect is focused on is a major factor in determining when
Miranda warnings are required).
69 Graham, What is "Cuestodial Interrogation?": California's Anticipatory Appli-
cation of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 59, 114 (1966).
7 0 Text accompanying note 32 suPra.
71 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
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Dickerson read the "in-custody" criterion as supplementing rather than
displacing the Escobedo "focus" criterion. 2 Perhaps the Dickerson
court saw in Miranda a "wish to push the rule to cover situations
where there is no custody, in the usual sense of the term, to restrict
for example, deliberate use of informers to elicit evidence .... "
But recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court was con-
cerned not so much with "focus" as with the coercive atmosphere of
in-custody interrogation. In Mathis v. United States,74 the Court
followed the Miranda language and looked to aspects of custodial inter-
rogation rather than to whether the government had focused on Mathis
during a routine civil audit." In Orozco v. Texas,7 the Court con-
ceivably could have based its decision on the fact that the officers had
focused on the suspect when they began their questioning in his bed-
room, but instead decided only on the grounds that the suspect was not
free to leave." In Hoffa v. United States,'78 the Court rejected de-
fendant's contention that, although he was not under arrest or in
custody at the time of his incriminating statements to an undercover
agent, he was entitled to the Miranda warnings because the govern-
ment had focused on him and had probable cause for an arrest7
9
Lower courts have also criticized the "focus" alternative. United
States v. Turzynski " in particular, the case most heavily relied upon
by the Dickerson court for its reading of Miranda,"' has been explicitly
rejected by other circuits. For example:
72 For an argument that the Miranda "in-custody" criterion displaces rather than
supplements the Escobedo "focus" criterion see Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation"
Within the Meaning of Miranda, in CRImINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 335,
338-51 (1968).
73 Graham, supra note 69, at 115.
14 391 U.S. 1 (1968). For a brief discussion of this case see text accompanying
notes 50-52 supra.
75 See 391 U.S. at 5.
76 394 U.S. 324 (1969). For a brief discussion of this case see text accompanying
notes 48-49 supra.
77 See 394 U.S. at 327.
78 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
79 Id. at 303-04.
80268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967). In holding that the Miranda warnings
applied to the criminal tax investigation, the district court stated:
The inception of the adversary process was the core of the Court's con-
cern in Escobedo and Miranda. While, as the Court pointed out, custody may
have a coercive effect, it is also an easily recognizable point at which the
adversary process can be said to have begun.
While criminal tax investigations by their nature are almost always
devoid of anything that smacks of custody, the administrative procedure of
the Internal Revenue System offers at least one equally tangible point at
which the adversary process can be said to have begun. . . . At this point
the taxpayer is under suspicion of tax fraud, the investigatory power of the
government is directed against him with the intent of developing evidence
to convict him and his need to know his rights is quite as real and urgent
as that of the suspect under custodial interrogation.
Id. at 853-54.
81 See 413 F.2d at 1115.
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[W]e reject the view, adopted by a few district courts in
other circuits, that IRS agents must give the Miranda warn-
ings, even though there is no custodial interrogation, if the
investigation has reached the accusatory stage. United States
v. Turzynski .... The Fifth Amendment privilege pro-
hibits the government from compelling a person to incriminate
himself. It was the compulsive aspect of custodial interroga-
tion, and not the strength or extent of the government's
suspicions at the time the questioning was conducted, which
led the Court to impose the Miranda requirements ....
We believe that the presence or absence of compelling pres-
sures, rather than the stage to which the government's investi-
gation has developed, determines whether the Miranda re-
quirements apply to any particular instance of questioning.'
The distinction is most apt. A careful reading of the fifth amendment
leads to a rejection of the Turzynski-Dickerson argument. "It is com-
pulsion to answer which offends against the fifth amendment provision
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." I The Court in Escobedo spoke of "focus" because,
as a sixth amendment case, it was concerned with the adequate and
timely representation of the defendant in the adversary process. On
the other hand, the Court in Miranda spoke repeatedly of "compul-
sion" out of a concern for the protection of a suspect's fifth amendment
rights. The Escobedo requirement that an attorney be available was
incorporated into Miranda not because of the focus of the govern-
mental investigation but because the Court believed that the presence
of an attorney mitigates the coercive atmosphere of a police interroga-
tion and protects against police abuses."
Furthermore, despite the Dickerson court's reliance on the analysis
that
[i]ntelligent exercise or waiver of the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege is the heart of the Court's concern in Miranda,3
the Miranda Court, in discussing intelligent exercise of the privilege, did
not bar as unconstitutional "any statement given freely and volun-
tarily without any compelling influences," 8 even though such state-
ments be given without full knowledge of their consequences. For
example, the Miranda Court stated that no warnings need be given to
a man who enters a police station and voluntarily confesses-regardless
of his knowledge of his right to remain silent.8 7 Finally, the Court in
Hoffa rejected the defendant's theory that, because his conversations
82 United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785, 790 (2d Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted).
83 413 F2d at 1118 (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
84 384 U.S. at 442, 465-66.
85 413 F2d at 1114.
86 384 U.S. at 478. But see Andrewvs, supra note 20, at 1080 n.19.
8 384 U.S. at 478.
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with an undercover agent occurred without intelligent waiver, evidence
gathered therefrom should be excluded. The Court instead dealt only
with the compulsion question:
[A]l1 have agreed that a necessary element of compulsory
self-incrimination is some kind of compulsion . . . . In the
present case no claim has or could be made that the peti-
tioner's incriminating statements were the product of any
sort of coercion, legal or factual. The petitioner's con-
versations . . were wholly voluntary.'
In conclusion, then, the Dickerson court failed to consider ade-
quately recent decisions strongly reinforcing the primacy of Miranda's
"in-custody" requirement over the Escobedo "focus" requirement.
III. CoMPtULSION IN TAx CASES
Dickerson contradicts the Second Circuit's holding in Mackie-
wicz " that the taxpayer's freedom of movement negates any inherent
coercion present in the investigation. On balance, the Second Circuit
appears to be correct.
The Dickerson court pointed out that psychological pressures on
the taxpayer during the interview subtly but effectively induce him to
cooperate with the IRS agents.' Support for this position may be
derived from a comparison of IRS agents' practices with those police
practices condemned by Miranda. Both IRS special agents and police
attempt to interrogate an individual in privacy so as to minimize
psychological support from outside sources. 1  Like the police, IRS
agents personify the authority of the government; and the average tax-
payer lacks both the knowledge of his constitutional rights and the
toughness of fiber to refuse to answer their questions.9 2 Also, the
Miranda Court regarded police manuals as a valuable source of in-
formation about the compulsive nature of police station interrogations;
it should be noted that the IRS resists efforts to gain access to its
investigative technique manuals and directives, and in one instance dis-
missed an action rather than comply with a court order to produce
them.93
88 385 U.S. at 304. Although use of undercover agents is expressly at odds with
the intelligent waiver reading of Miranda, their use has been upheld by the Supreme
Court. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1966) ; Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). But see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 314-21
(Warren, C.J., dissenting).
89 401 F2d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968). For a brief
discussion of this case see text accompanying notes 63-66 supra.
!oSee 413 F.2d at 1115-16.
91 -ewitt, supra note 22, at 683 (1966). Interrogation in private was cited by
the Supreme Court in Miranda as the principal psychological factor contributing to
successful police interrogation. 384 U.S. at 449 (1966).
92United States v. Maius, 378 F2d 716, 719 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
905 (1967) ; see Andrews, supra note 20, at 1112-13; Lipton, supra note 53 at 336-37.
9 Lipton, supra note 53, at 337 n.61 (1968).
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Yet, despite evidence of some psychological coercion, clearly an
interrogation by IRS agents in the familiar surroundings of a tax-
payer's home or office is not as intimidating as the police station inter-
rogation condemned by Miranda. In contrast to the picture painted
in Miranda of the police third degree-relentless questioning for long
hours, the omnipresence and omnipotence of the police surrounding the
suspect-the criminal tax investigation usually spans a series of inter-
views perhaps continuing for as long as three years. 4 The interviews
themselves are often informal, akin to shop talks among businessmen.
The taxpayer's freedom of movement, while not necessarily identical
to the freedom to terminate the interview suggested by Mackiewics,
affords the taxpayer much respite between interviews. Statements
given during these interviews are certainly less compelled than those
elicited during police interrogations.
Thus, on the whole, the tax investigation does not possess the
inherently compelling atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. While
there may well be instances of true compulsion in tax investigations,
the element of compulsion cannot be deemed so "inherent" in the
circumstances as to indicate that the Miranda warnings and a shift in
the burden of proof of voluntariness to the government are necessary
to combat the infringement of fifth amendment rights. The volun-
tariness test is adequate to decide whether compulsion did exist in any
particular case.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE Dickerson APPROACH
The IRS admitted in the Dickerson case that it had failed to give
Miranda warnings or any other warnings of constitutional rights to
Dickerson. 3 In oral argument before the court, the government
characterized the then existing IRS requirement-that its special
agents give a modified version of the Miranda warnings at the first
interview-as an act of grace. 6  However, the IRS implementation
of its own warning offers a more acceptable route to the same result
sought by the Dickerson court. If, as this Comment has argued,
Miranda does not apply, then the IRS is free to mold the warnings to
better adapt to the problems raised in tax investigations. The IRS
has placed the following requirements on the special agents:
At the initial meeting with a taxpayer, a Special Agent is
now required to identify himself, describe his function, and
advise the taxpayer that anything he says may be used against
him. The Special Agent will also tell the taxpayer that he
94 See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 405 F2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 937 (1969) (no arrest during investigation lasting 2Y2 years) ; United States
v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (no arrest during approximately
3-year investigation).
D 413 F2d at 1112.
96d. at 1117 n.12.
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cannot be compelled to incriminate himself by answering any
questions or producing any documents, and that he has the
right to seek the assistance of an attorney before responding. 7
The warnings are not the full Miranda warnings that are given to the
taxpayer after he is arrested." There is no provision for counsel for
indigents; but the number of indigent taxpayers investigated by the
IRS is "overwhelmingly small." ' The warnings are nevertheless of
concrete value to the taxpayer under investigation by special agents.
The bare Miranda warnings and nothing else might mislead the tax-
payer since they do not explain the purpose of the interrogation.' By
requiring the special agent to state his purpose of investigating for
possible criminal tax violations and to inform the taxpayer of his con-
stitutional rights to remain silent and retain counsel, the IRS warning
will immediately alert most taxpayers to the possible seriousness of
their predicament.
Having instituted a warnings requirement, the IRS may not now
disregard it. In United States v. Heffner,' the taxpayer was not
warned of the special agent's function nor advised that he could retain
counsel during the interviews despite an IRS News Release 102 (prede-
cessor to the one now in effect 11) stating that he would be so warned.
The Fourth Circuit in Heffner based its decision on United States
ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,'" in which the Supreme Court vacated
a deportation order issued by the Board of Immigration because the
procedure followed by the Board did not conform to its relevant regu-
lations. The Court held that such deviation was a denial of due process.
The Fourth Circuit, finding the same denial in the agent's deviation,
held that admission at the trial of the special agent's testimony con-
cerning the taxpayer's incriminating statements was reversible error
calling for remand.'0 The Heffner court explained:
An agency of the government must scrupulously observe
rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established.
97 IRS News Release IR-949, Nov. 26, 1968, quoted in Cohen v. United States,
405 F2d 34, 39 (8th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added). For the distinction between special
agents and revenue agents see text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
9sText accompanying note 13 supra.
99 Telephone interview with Herbert S. Mednick (former special agent) in
Philadelphia, Pa., Jan. 13, 1970.
0 O See Comment, Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Tax Fraud Investi-
gation, 42 TUL. L. REv. 862, 876 (1968).
1.01420 F2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969).
1.02 IRS News Release No. 897, Oct. 3, 1967, reprinted in 7 CCH 1967 STAND.
FFD. TAx REP. § 6832.
103 Text accompanying note 98 supra.
-10 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
105 The Accardi doctrine does not terminate a case but requires a remand for new
determinations consistent with established procedures irrespective of whether a new
trial would produce the same result. See United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th
Cir. 1969).
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When it fails to do so, its action cannot stand and courts
will strike it down.'
However, implementation of the IRS rule may pose some prob-
lems. In some instances, revenue agents, not subject to the pre-
scriptions of the news release (which applies only to special agents),
may unintentionally gather evidence sufficient for conviction before re-
ferral to the Intelligence Division.0 7 Yet to require IRS revenue
agents to inform all taxpayers interviewed of the possibility of criminal
prosecution might create needless anxiety and legal expense for the
alarmed taxpayer. Because less than three-tenths of one per cent of
all returns audited are carried beyond the routine audit and civil de-
ficiency stage,l s a court is unlikely to find a compelling need for
warnings. 19
A more difficult problem may arise if the revenue agents either
take it upon themselves or are encouraged by the IRS to expand their
inquiries and seek incriminating evidence before referral to the Intelli-
gence Division."0 Were this to happen, the revenue agent would be
assuming the function of a special agent contrary to IRS regulations,"'
and thus the principle of Heffner should prevail.
10 61d. at 811; see 413 F2d at 1118 (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
' 0 7 See Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34, 39 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 943 (1969).
108 Duke, Prosecutions For Attempts To Evade Income Tax: A Discordant
View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1, 34, 39 (1966).
109 See United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 923 (1968).
11o Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34, 39 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 943 (1969).
"'lIn Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court in finding an invalid
interrogation looked not only to the agent's label-revenue or special-but also to his
apparent purpose. The Court relied on the fact that, though the interview was super-
ficially civil in nature, the last visit of the revenue agent took place only eight days
before the full-fledged criminal investigation began. Id. at 4. Furthermore, investi-
gation of Mathis was prompted by a letter from local authorities to the IRS Intelli-
gence Division which, for reasons not disclosed by the record, did not commence a
criminal investigation but referred the matter to the IRS Audit Division. See Lipton,
Supreme Court's decision in Mathis likely to have very limited effect, 29 J. TAX. 32,
33 n.3 (1968). Thus, although the Court refused to draw a distinction between IRS
revenue and special agents with regard to warning a taxpayer in prison, the Mathis
record warrants the inference that the revenue agent was exceeding his civil function
and gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution. Id. 32-33.
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